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Abstract  
A lack of practitioner insight into managing the ‘crisis response’ is a glaring gap in the 
communications literature, and its subset of sport communications, that exacerbates the 
academic-practitioner divide. Senior sport communications professionals in Northern Ireland 
provided their perspectives on issues and crisis management via in-depth interviews.  Findings 
revealed that practitioners pay considerable attention to the ‘tipping point’, the point where a 
crisis emerged from an existing issue marking the initiation of a crisis response.  Declaring a 
crisis was deemed a last resort in the management of issues due to declarations being associated 
with resource and reputational risks.  Practitioners developed their own methods for managing 
the crisis response, however reflection upon academic approaches informed these views.  
Capacity issues within the sport sector in the region means that traditional media remain the 
practitioners’ most important stakeholder in a crisis. Areas for further research for (sport) issues 
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1.0 Introduction  
Sport communication has long been established as a legitimate field of public relations 
(Hopwood, 2005; L’Etang, 2006). Within sport communications research the management of 
an individual’s or an organisation’s response to a crisis has received considerable attention 
(Brown & Billings, 2013; Bruce & Tini, 2008; Fortunato, 2008; Frandsen & Johansen, 2007; 
Frederick & Sanderson, 2015; Glantz, 2010; Hambrick, Onwumechili & Bedeau, 2016; Walsh 
& McAllister-Spooner, 2011).  Much of this attention has used is freely available, media-data 
to examine the responses created (Ha & Riffe, 2015), while the voices of the practitioners 
involved has remained on the margins (Manoli, 2016).  This marginalized position creates a 
problem as the lack of attention to practitioner perspectives could increase the distance of any 
academic-practitioner divide in public relations practice. With vast amounts of public data 
provided through social media the potential occurrence of crises will only increase (Spence, 
Lachlan & Rainer, 2016).  Academic-practitioner gaps concern many applied academic fields, 
including management (Hughes, Bence, Grisoni, O’Regan & Wornham, 2011), marketing 
(Lilien, 2011; Tapp, 2005), public relations (Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016) and has also been 
discussed in the mainstream press (Kristoff, 2014).  This dichotomy however, is avoidable.  
Bartunek and Rynes (2014) suggest that rather than see the difference as a gap we should view 
it as a source of tension.  This source of tension is fundamental in developing theoretical and 
practical advances in applied research areas.  Our purpose therefore, is to examine how this 
tension is manifested in sport communications in Northern Ireland and as such, explore 
mechanisms for alleviating this tension.  As such, this study addresses the shortage of 
practitioner perspectives in communications research (Ha & Riffe, 2015) by examining sport 
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communications professionals’ crisis response strategies.  Drawing on data generated from 
extensive in-depth, elite interviews with senior sport communication practitioners in Northern 
Ireland, this paper explores the dimensions of the academic-practitioner gap within this area of 
interest.  We also explore the centrality and influence of academic perspectives on decision-
making processes informing crisis response by examining participants’ familiarity with such 
literature.   
 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section orientates our study by examining 
the predominant perspective on crisis response in sport communications before addressing 
some conceptual ambiguity within issues management and crisis communications, before 
contextualising this discussion within Northern Ireland.  Following this, an overview of the 
methodology employed in this paper is presented.  A discussion of the results is the basis of 
the penultimate section before the paper’s conclusions, contributions and areas for further 
research are presented. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Crisis Communication in Sport 
As a cultural practice, sport has abounded with crises, (Edwards & Usher, 2010) that have 
moved it from the back to the front pages, and these have been well examined phenomena in 
sport communications research.  Crises within sport communication has typically been 
examined through major crisis theories drawn from the wider communications literature; 
Coombs’ (2012) Situation Crisis Communication Theory (Brown & Billings, 2013; Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2007), or Benoit’s (1997) Image Repair Theory (Bruce & Tini, 2008; Glantz, 
2010; Hambrick, Frederick & Sanderson, 2015; Onwumechili & Bedeau, 2016; Walsh & 
McAllister-Spooner, 2011), or a combination of these approaches (Fortunato, 2008).  These 
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studies have extended both theory and its application for sport communications which has 
increased our understanding of what is best practice in sport communications.  
 
Whilst our understanding has grown on the ideal strategies for handling a crisis, the media-data 
approach employed in many of the above studies approach exposes the lack of practitioner 
viewpoints, reflecting the wider communications literature (Ha & Riffe, 2015). Our collective 
understanding is, in the main limited to viewing crises only once the event occurs.  These post-
hoc analyses do not pay sufficient attention to the decisions taken prior-to or during the crisis 
by practitioners behind the scenes.  As such, the situation of an issue transforming into a crisis 
remains unexplored presenting a clear gap in sport communications research.   
 
2.2 Definitions and Commonalities in Issues and Crisis Management 
To understand the gaps between academic and practitioner knowledge, it is important to 
examine the conceptual ambiguities that shape this study.  Much attention has been devoted to 
definitions of issues and crises (Jacques, 2009) and identifying commonalities of these two 
approaches in terms of the life cycle approach.  An issue is defined both as “a subject and the 
result of public discussion” that organisations can participate in (Femers, Klewes & Lintemeier, 
1999, p. 254).  Whilst a crisis is defined as an imprecise science with a dearth of existing 
definitions, this study employs the definition of Coombs’ (2012) as “the perception of an 
unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously 
impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs 2012, p. 2).  
This definition was chosen because of the emphasis on perceptions, which has relevance for 
the methods used.   
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Building upon the work of Chase (1980) issues management has been developed 
through research and practice (Jacques, 2009; Taylor, Vasquez and Doorley, 2003).  Health 
and Palenchar (2009) emphasised the strategic importance of an organisations’ participation in 
public policy discourse and processes.  Favourable outcomes, such as pro-business regulations 
could arise from such participation (Taylor, et al., 2003).  Issues management has now evolved 
to permit the participation of non-governmental organisations and community groups in direct 
response to the participation of corporations in public life (Jacques, 2009), with further 
evolution occurring due to the abundance of digital media and the capacity demands this places 
upon the process, such as the media scanning of multiple communications channels (Strauß & 
Jonkman, 2017; Spence et al, 2016). 
 
Similar to issues management, crisis management is best considered through the life 
cycle approach (Bruce & Tini, 2008).  However, unlike issues the variability of the term crisis 
makes the identification of a crisis problematic (Coombs, 2012).  A lack of clarity on 
definitions means discrepancies exist in whether a crisis is an event or a process, with each 
further splintering practitioner’s understanding (Jacques, 2009) and intensifying the problem 
identified earlier.  Crisis management is more concerned with the maintenance of reputation 
than with any potential contributions, or participation in the public policy process (Coombs, 
2012; Jacques, 2009).  There are a range of crisis management models therefore, by examining 
the process approach to both issues and crisis management our focus remains on practice. 
 
Practitioners have long been caught-out by the sudden nature of crisis escalation 
(Seymore & Moore, 2000) and over the past decade social media has quickened this. The 
copious amounts of publicly available, social media data will continue and as such, controlling 
crisis response in this media context is paramount (Spence et al., 2016).  This is true even if 
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the ability of managers to control the situation is not always guaranteed.  Controlling the timing 
of a crisis response has been the focus of recent research by Claeys and colleagues (Claeys & 
Cauberghe, 2012; Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016; Claeys, 2017). A proactive approach has 
emerged from the literature; ‘Stealing Thunder’ allows an organisation to self-declare a crisis. 
The aim is to ensure the organisation’s reputation remains robust as the crisis response is 
determined already waiting to be implemented, for example Maria Sharapova’s self-declared 
meldonium use in 2016.  The traditional approach is to await the ‘Thunder’ to arrive, which 
assumes the public will become aware of a critical issue and then the organisation’s crisis 
response is put into action (Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016). Timing therefore rests with the 
decision of practitioners to initiate a tipping point where the issue evolves into a crisis. If issues 
and crisis management are ready for implementation, ‘stealing thunder’ and ‘thunder’ could 
both be managed to preserve, or even enhance reputations.   
 
 
2.3 Research Context 
This study is set in Northern Ireland - a home nation of the United Kingdom with a population 
of 1.852 million people (NISRA, 2016). It was established by the Government of Ireland Act 
(1920) and the partition of Ireland between the 26 counties of the ‘South’ and the six counties 
of the ‘North’ – and is a region with deep rooted tensions and a contested history arising from 
differing constitutional aspirations between the ‘Protestant, Unionist, Loyalist’ (who wish to 
see NI remain as a part of the UK) and the ‘Catholic, Nationalist, Republican’ (who wish to 
see the repeal of partition and the reunification of a 32 county Ireland) communities.  Between 
the late 1960s and the mid-1990s a period of conflict, known as ‘the troubles’, saw these 
divisions result in open conflict.  Since the signing of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ in April 
1998 the region has experienced relative peace and attempts to reconcile the two de facto ethno-
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sectarian communities have led to the beginnings of a post-conflict society (Rice & Somerville, 
2013).  Northern Ireland has been the focus of previous public relations and communications 
research.  Scholars have previously examined public relations in the historical context of the 
troubles (Somerville & Purcell, 2011), the current power-sharing government (Rice & 
Somerville, 2013), and how the segregated educational system has impacted upon the 
pedagogical approaches to communications education (Somerville, Purcell & Morrison, 2011).  
This study extends this focus to the institutions of sport within this region. 
Sport is an important area of cultural practice in Northern Ireland and akin to sports 
practices found elsewhere, the management of sport has a series of unique factors (Smith & 
Stewart, 2010) for instance in relation to organizational communications, the bonds of 
community can prevent damage arising from crisis (Koerber & Zabara, 2017).  However, in 
Northern Ireland the ethno-sectarian differences between the two communities is also reflected 
in the organisation of its major sports of rugby union, Gaelic games, field hockey and 
association football which have been historically viewed along divided community lines.  
While one community may view a sport favourably, another may view it as a distinct, and 
possibly alien cultural practice (Bairner, 2001).  
Despite this, some advances have been made in professionalising the working practices 
of the sports industry in Northern Ireland.  However, many athletes still compete in amateur 
competition, and there are very few professional athletes based in regular competition. 
Increasing the existing level of professionalization will require greater specificity in the skills 
and competences of sport managers (Hopwood, Skinner & Kitchin, 2010).  Where 
organisational capacity permits, the management of both issues and crises rest within the 
communications team.  Ongoing issues management is the daily function of the staff team, 
while the management of episodic crisis rests with senior sport communications managers or 
the CEO (Jacques, 2009).  However, for the many smaller and/or not-for-profit organisations 
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that comprise the sports industry in Northern Ireland, organisational capacity is a key issue 
(Misener & Doherty, 2009). When crisis occurs in these organisations, who rarely possess a 
communications professional let alone a crisis team, it can pose major threats to organisational 
reputations. This lack of capacity throughout the sport industry has created opportunities for 
communications specialists to bring their skills to bear as intermediaries.  It is these 
professionals (and their practices) which are the focus of this paper. 
 
3.0 Research Questions: 
Based on the current paucity of practitioner responses and the key points raised above, the 
following research questions were addressed. 
RQ1: How do sport communications practitioners in Northern Ireland define an issue and a 
crisis, and;  
RQ2: at what stage can one transform into the other? 
RQ3: In light of a rapidly changing media landscape, how do these practitioners prefer to 
manage the crisis response in sport communication? 
 
4.0 Methodology  
This paper examines issue and crisis management devices employed by those working with 
sport organisations within Northern Ireland. Our approach was framed from an interpretative 
standpoint exploring how the participants reflected upon their practice in light of the academic 
information (Daymon & Holloway, 2011).  This section will outline the sampling approach, 





As the total population of sport communications practitioners in this region is small we used a 
snowball sampling strategy.  As such this technique gathered seven respondents.  Each of these 
respondents had full-time roles in public relations and communications, either within sport 
organisations or as general practitioners.  Some of these general practitioners had 
responsibilities on the Boards of Governors of various other sport organizations.  To maintain 
confidentiality and anonymity each interviewee was allocated a pseudonym, however a brief 
overview of their previous experience is contained in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Respondent pseudonym and background 
1. Cullan – Former Director of Communications for Large Broadcasting 
Corporation (LBC) and Statutory Law Authority, PR Consultant and News 
Editor of A Local Paper.  Currently sport correspondent and international crisis 
consultant. 
2. Donncha – Experienced PR and media consultant.  Formerly sub-editor of A 
Local Paper and PR Director for Communications Agency.  Currently issues 
and crisis consultant. 
3. Michial – Formerly a PR consultant and Medium Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC) sports editor.  Currently Communications Manager of a Professional 
Sports Team. Extensive experience in PR and crisis communications.  
4. Tadgh – International Sports PR and Digital Communications Consultant. A 
specialist in issue and crisis communications. 
5. Ciaran - Currently Director of Marketing and Communications at a major 
National Governing Body.  
6. Ronan – Formerly deputy CEO of a European National Olympic Committee 
(NOC).  Currently CEO of a local NOC. 
7. Eoghan – Currently PR and media consultant. Chartered Institute of Public 
Relations (CIPR) Fellow with commendation for services to the Northern 
Ireland PR industry. 
 
4.2 Data Collection Tools  
In depth interviews are a trusted and well-used form of data collection in public relations 
research (Daymon & Holloway, 2011).  In this paper, we report on findings from a series of 
elite interviews with sport communications practitioners.  McEvoy (2006) suggested that 
particular concerns should be taken when interviewing elite, key informants in divided 
societies.  Following our university’s research governance system, each participant was 
 11 
provided with information sheets and statement of informed consent as standard research 
practice. In addition to this, we ensured that our respondents were provided with a draft 
schedule of the proposed questions prior to the interview commencing.  As sport in this region 
is intrinsically linked to community identity the questions were organized allowing the 
interviewer to move from non-threatening questions on generic issues and crisis issues, to 
potentially more detailed (and possibly threatening) queries of how the participant was 
involved with specific crises (McEvoy, 2006). 
 
A semi-structured approach was chosen because there was a need to ask specific 
questions in relation to the practitioners’ significant experiences in communication.  An 
advantage of the semi-structured approach taken is that it permitted emerging themes on the 
academic-practitioner gap to be explored further (King, 2004).  Interviews took place over a 
four-month period in late 2013.  Each was situated in either the participant’s place of work or 
in a public venue.  Each interview was digitally recorded and lasted between 60-80 minutes, 
and following each interview’s completion they were transcribed verbatim.  The digital 
recording allowed the researchers to increase their awareness of the issues that were important 
to each respondent (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). Interviewees were provided with their 
transcripts and given the opportunity to add additional comments if they thought it had not 
been expressed during the interview, in order to ensure research validity (Carson et al 2000). 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The in-depth, elite interviews generated over 90,000 words spanning 68 pages of 
transcripts.  Data analysis followed Strauss and Corbin’s (2015) coding procedure to reduce 
the data into manageable segments. The initial step to manage this data was to form the data 
into a number of open codes.  This process began immediately following the first interview by 
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creating a number of categories to capture and organize the data from the interviews. The 
coding was performed by both researchers independently and then the codes were matched to 
enhance the trustworthiness of this process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  An example of how the 
codes were derived is contained in table 2.  Following this, a process of axial coding attempted 
to link relationships between the open codes.  The agreed codes included themes such as 
“defining”, “respondent perspectives”, and “response process” (Strauss & Corbin, 2015). The 
final phase of selective coding drew abstractions from the data in order to bring together the 
relationships from the axial phase to inform the practice and add to our academic approaches.   
 
Table 2: Example of coding process for interview transcripts 
Participant Utterance Codes 
Cullan Too many companies, when they 
are trying to save money cut back on 
the marketing and PR. A crisis is 
something that can cause irreparable 
damage to your organisation and the 
most important thing about a crisis 
is knowing you are in one, or not 










Eoghan Yes, it becomes a crisis, turns from 
an issue to a crisis, yes, you have 
got to manage it. ….you have to 
respond, because if you leave 
something go on and on and on, in 
most cases it gets worse, the media 
get frustrated, the stakeholders get 
frustrated, and then they start to 
think the worst, and then they take 
a situation and multiply it three or 
four times which all the time is 
damaging the brand of the 












Reputational risk  
 
4.4 Methodological limitations  
There were two limitations in our approach. The first is that the focus on Northern 
Ireland limits the generalizability of this study.  This was deemed acceptable due to its 
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exploratory nature and the fact that is covers public relations practice in a divided society.  
Furthermore, while these findings do not represent global practice, the region does provide an 
interesting context as even within Europe there are regional differences across various 
countries (Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016; Straub & Jonkman, 2016; Verhoeven, Tench, Zerfass, 
Moreno & Verčič, 2014).  While sport, at this level, is far from fully professional in practice, 
it is professional in its management at the governing body level (a regional association 
representing sport clubs and participants).  Therefore, the findings reflect crisis practice where 
specialist (and often external) sport communications practitioners are still required to assist 
sports because of a lack of capacity within sports organisations.  The second, and arguably 
more important limitation is that our sample is restricted to male respondents.  This was 
unfortunate but unintentional. 
 
5.0 Findings & Discussion 
Data generated through the interviews explored the participant’s background and their 
involvement in sport either as a past participant or current player.  All of the respondents 
consider themselves communications practitioner’s first and foremost, the academic subset of 
sport communications that we introduced to two of the respondents (having not have heard it 
before) was considered a minor consideration within their total responsibilities.  However, 
respondents did mention the sports sector’s ability to generate crisis, suggesting that while 
crisis communications may be infrequent, when crisis do occur they are very public and very 
newsworthy.  These results provide rich and detailed insights into practitioner’s crisis 
responses strategies in sport communications. 
 
5.1. Issues, crisis and the tipping point 
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There were some commonalities between the practitioners’ perspectives of issues and crisis. 
Given the expertise and experience of the crisis practitioners, much discussion was given to 
the ‘processes’ and ‘rules’ for managing issues and crisis communication.  An issue was an 
ongoing situation rather than an episodic crisis. Some examples offered as issues in the context 
of Northern Ireland included sectarianism, political failures and a divided society.  Many 
respondents felt that issues that ‘bubbled under-the-surface’ could be managed, or even 
avoided.  Tadgh noted that ‘an issue tends to be something which may have an impact but it’s 
relatively minor and should be able to be handled in a relatively small-scale way’. Donncha 
described crisis as ‘any unforeseen event that threatens the viability of an organization’, Tadgh 
added the associated factors of ‘death, life, limb, serious physical injury to staff or an 
employee’, while Michial contributed the ‘long term damage to the reputation of the sports 
organization’, both ‘internal and external’ and an array of potential crisis event including 
‘something happening to one of the players, or something happening at the ground, it could be 
a mismanagement or a personal crisis’. There was general consensus on how an issue 
transforms into a crisis (Regester & Larkin, 2008). Michial stressed the importance of 
preventing the ‘tipping point’ when an issue is ‘picked up’, and a crisis situation is avoided.  
Issues in this region included topics such as sectarianism, and efforts to achieve reconciliation 
between the segments of each community. 
 
 Unlike the crisis literature, considerable emphasis was given on the decision as to 
whether a crisis actually existed. Eoghan explained that in the advent of an incident; 
We will keep it very simple. First establish is it a crisis. Now that might sound a 
stupid response, but in many cases allegations are made and they cause crises and 
they might actually be factually incorrect so the first thing to do is say “is this a 
crisis”? 
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Michial stressed that often a lack of communication, or clarity with key stakeholders is then 
amplified by the media in their reporting.  He discussed the immediate ramifications of a crisis 
being declared; 
This was an issue that became a crisis by bad decisions. It resulted in an interview 
at half-time in one of the games here at the Club. A journalist covering the press 
conference asked the CEO “was this a PR disaster?”  
Now if a journalist asks is this a PR disaster, it’s already a PR disaster.   
 
One aspect of the issues and crisis management approaches that did result in some extended 
discussion was the point at which a crisis emerges from an issue, and the importance of the 
practitioner and the sports organization recognising the warning signs in the risk-issue lifecycle 
(Regester & Larkin, 2008).  Emphasis was placed on monitoring activities that practitioners 
engaged with but the partner sports organisations did little pre-planning to anticipate.  This 
reflects the gaps that can form in not-for-profit sport organisations where other planning tasks, 
such as the development of athletes taking priority (Misener & Doherty, 2009).  Issue audits 
were one approach offered by a respondent that would monitor the progress of relevant issues 
in an attempt to time the tipping point correctly. It was suggested that declaring a crisis too 
early could be just as detrimental to the reputation of the organization as failing to understand 
that a crisis had already occurred.   
 
5.2 Practitioner’s sport communications crisis responses 
Practitioner’s use of crisis typologies reflected crisis academics’ use of metaphors, such as 
Seymour and Moore’s (2000) cobra and python and Broom and Sha’s (2012) sustained, 
smouldering, immediate and emerging. However, practitioners adapt existing frameworks or 
develop their own.  A metaphor of crisis was described by Donncha as the banana index and 
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was deemed relevant in the context of digital communication.  Donncha described the green 
banana as the “sudden” and unexpected crisis that needed; 
Pre-agreed procedures, to have a crisis communications plan in place, to have a crisis 
management team identified and have a chain of command in your communications. 
That’s how you guard against the green banana, because you don't know what it is.  
The yellow banana was the emerging crisis and organisations should “have planned ahead, you 
would have had your responses scripted, ready and in place”.  The final level of Donncha’s 
typology, the brown banana was described as; 
 The mouldy ones (which are getting more and more common in today’s regulated 
world) basically those old sins or old actions judged by new standards. These are 
things that at the time people judge differently, people didn't look into, there were 
different standards, different morals…they are very difficult to deal with. 
The sporting “brown banana’ typology can be seen in the significant sport crises of Floyd 
Landis (Glantz, 2010) and Lance Armstrong (Hambrick, et al., 2015) whereby specific 
incidents revealed historical cases that created a crisis that damaged their reputations. 
 
Respondents’ stressed the need to check before making the final decision to ‘implement 
the crisis communication plan’ (Donncha).  However, once a crisis was declared the 
practitioners offered phases of a crisis similar to those of crisis academics (Coombs, 2012; 
Seymour & Moore, 2000). If a crisis has been recognized the crucial questions must be asked. 
‘What is the crisis? What level of crisis is it?’ Each of these questions requires the 
establishment of facts (Michial). Fact finding was mentioned by all of those interviewed as a 
crucial part of handling a crisis effectively. The success of this fact-finding stage relies heavily 
on Donncha’s point that organizations need to have ‘clear internal lines of communication and 
a culture of openness’, as Tadgh explains all ‘stakeholders’ will have to be contacted to ‘make 
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sure we have the story straight’. Following this, Michial suggests the crisis team will need to 
meet and agree ‘next steps’. He described an action plan much like that recommended by 
Seymour and Moore (2000, p. 102), whereby there are cycles of meetings which analyze and 
review the situation, agree next steps and “monitor” the coverage, these meetings are then 
repeated on an agreed time schedule.  
 
5.2.1 Controlling the response 
Needing to maintain control during a crisis was the respondent’s top priority.  For Cullan and 
Donncha, managing the situation was about being ‘perceived to be in charge’ (Donncha), or 
being ‘seen to be in control, in command’ (Cullan). Cullan went further and offered two pieces 
of practical advice for when a crisis hits; 
Firstly, you clear the desks...wipe out diaries.... crisis is about deploying your 
resources as well, you have your crisis plan, you have your comms [sic.] people, 
but you got to know who is deployed where and secondly you log everything.  
 
Tadgh explained the practical implications of maintaining clear internal communication; 
‘There needs to be a blanket silence that goes on in the rest of company, no one 
speculates on Facebook, social media, Twitter, anything like that .... because the 
journalist will work their way around the company and phone anyone they can to 
get a comment and so you need to make sure your entire staff are briefed’.   
Ronan, Cullan and Michial noted a significant risk was the lack of control over individuals 
associated with the organization, despite precautions in their contractual agreements or written 
guidelines. Michial explained some of the power-relations difficulties exposed in this 
approach;  
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No player will do a media interview without me knowing it. In fact, I will give you 
an example of it. A local newspaper rang the head coach about a fortnight ago and 
asked him for a comment and he gave it. I had to say through the director of sport, 
he can’t do that and that’s the head coach of the team...... you’re never going to be 
100 percent in control of the things that come out of this organization but I’ve got 
to be as much in control as possible. So that’s why we have very strict media 
policies for the players. 
 
Each respondent presented examples of where this had worked well and where it had not. 
Ronan provided an example of the control expected from his team during the 2012 London 
Summer Olympic Games;  
It was one of our biggest issues that we discussed as part of our PR plan and in the 
main, 99 percent of athletes obeyed by the team members’ agreement on these 
issues but there were a couple of athletes that put a tweet out and they didn’t realise 
that that might spiral.... journalists are looking at tweets and they will say, 
disharmony in the camp and that’s the headline and it couldn’t be further from the 
truth.  
In response to a specific crisis, Michial provided an example of how communicating the 
specific, yet tragic circumstances surrounding the death of a player effectively managed the 
news cycle;  
So, when Malcolm died we managed the crisis. We said no player speaks. I wrote 
the Club Captain’s statement, with the captain the only player that spoke for the 
players that week, no other player mentioned it, no other coach did anything, 
because that was the appropriate thing to do. It’s not about keeping messaging at 
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that time but we just wanted a united voice and that united voice came through the 
captain. 
 
Once control is assured, a context for efficient communication can be created.  First, decisions 
are made to unify the message.  Second, consultation with sport’s direct family or other close 
stakeholders occurs and then, third the media is informed. Tadgh states ‘you put it out there to 
the journalist...you put it out there to social media, you make sure your side of the story is out 
there’, Building on this Donncha stressed you need to be aware that in a crisis you are having 
to deal with emotions as well as facts, he recommended that the story must be clear as well as 
‘empathetic and sympathetic’ to mitigate the potential for upset and anger (Seeger, 2006).   
 
5.2.2. Delivering the response 
The line of communication an organization takes will depend on what has happened, but 
Donncha suggested some ‘common errors’ of media communication during a crisis. Firstly, 
hesitation. Donncha emphasized that a short delay may be necessary as facts are gathered but 
“excessive delay” allows journalists to “conjure up the worst possible image” (Mitroff et al. 
1996, p. 117). It is this hesitation which can turn the media’s attitude from neutral or 
sympathetic to hostile (Regester & Larkin, 2008). Furthermore, a prolonged hesitation or a ‘no 
comment’ can give the impression that an organization is hiding something and often lead to a 
loss of control as the media find alternate sources. Donncha noted that retaliation or 
confrontation may escalate a crisis further and compromises control and obscurity may be 
interpreted as dishonesty.  With regards to decisions to ‘withhold’ information (Donncha), 
there was agreement between the interviewees and the literature, whatever needs to be 
disclosed should be. Information which will ‘control the situation’ (Eoghan) and ‘protect the 
organization within the law should be unveiled’ (Cullan). Donncha noted ‘you do not hold back 
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anything that is essential to the needs of your stakeholders, including the media, but Tadgh also 
warns against exposing more than is necessary ‘you only say what you need to say, be short 
and precise.’  All of the practitioners explicitly warned against lying. Cullan noted ‘once the 
media think you tell lies you might as well go and get another job’.  Some warned that any lies 
told will eventually be uncovered by the media and therefore any information given out should 
be wholly truthful (Regester & Larkin, 2008; Seymour & Moore, 2000). 
 
In this case, we revealed that practitioners suggest a strategic process is employed that 
focuses upon the usual activities of issues management, such as preparation, monitoring and 
control (Coombs, 2012; Seeger, 2006) but incorporating social media.  These activities aim to 
prevent issues escalating into crisis.  In the advent of a crisis occurring on-going activities that 
support the crisis process include fact-checking, crisis team meetings, action planning and 
crisis communication.  Emphasis was placed on communicating efficiently, hence the crisis 
process aimed to reduce the time taken to get the right message out to the media.  As a result, 
these issues and crisis management activities align with approaches found in the literature 
(Coombs, 2012; Glantz, 2008; Regester & Larkin, 2008), revealing that these models are 
common in Northern Irish communications practice. Nevertheless, missing from the 
approaches was sufficient details about the pre-crisis or preparation phase.  Issues such as 
sectarianism, racial divides and political status are well known across the region, there was 
little evidence of pre-planning in the advent of these issues becoming a crisis.  For example, a 
racially motivated incident occurred in an Ulster Gaelic Athletic Association club match in 
December 2012. When the incident was raised in the media, the organization delayed their 
response as they did not, at the time have an official policy on racial discrimination. Therefore, 
despite operating in this context that has been plagued with sectarian issues, creeping 
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professionalization had not influenced crisis processes, in particular reputation risk 
management.  
 
Despite many respondents’ acknowledgement that issues and crisis management requires 
careful planning a few did stress that they believed each type of crisis posed different threats 
to organizational reputation, and while models are useful, there was an agreement of caution 
in making generalizations about the processes, Michial noted; 
 “is an art, it’s not a science...it’s not apply X, Y and Z and the outcome is this, it 
doesn’t work like that, media is a living breathing organization that can bite you, it 
can drag you down, and you can fight it off with everything you have, but it can 
still do it.” 
 
5.2.3 The local impact of social media 
The uncensored nature of social media was a concern (Spence et al., 2016; Vail et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the practitioners advised organizations to monitor social media, but with the mindset 
that you have to ‘choose your battles’ (Donncha). He further explained, ‘you are never going 
to respond to all the negative coverage, so you need to kind of qualify how valid and how 
influential is the source’.  If an organization is to respond to public criticism, the practitioners 
advised to respond through more private mediums. Tadgh stated, ‘I think if possible you would 
want to actually get a phone number, or try and speak to them’ and Michial noted for his team; 
Criticisms tend to come through emails or Facebook emails and we will respond to 
them. That gives us discretion then to be able to take negative conversations offline, 
off the public sphere, off the public page and have the conversation directly.  
Michial suggested that in crisis and sport communication fans who ‘say something really 
negative about the club, get [berated] by everyone else’.  Michial suggested that ‘Facebook 
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regulates itself’ through its supporters, so intervention is sometimes not necessary. This adds 
another consideration to the practice of crisis communication but can soften the impact of a 
crisis on the reputation of the organization (see also Brown & Billings, 2013). 
 
Practitioners agreed that there were clear benefits from effective social media use within 
a crisis.  Precautionary measures are vital to counteract the speed by which crisis can spiral via 
social media. Cullan stressed ‘it is about surviving the first two or three days and then being 
seen to be efficient’. To respond quickly, training and preparation are recommended.  Cullan 
explained how past comments made through social media could create issues and potentially 
crisis. He went on to give an example of how an organization can use training to inform athletes 
of their responsibilities;  
I agreed to give a talk to their bright young stars of the future to put the fear of God 
into them about Twitter because these athletes can ruin their careers now…the 
athletes were smart enough about not saying stupid things to the newspapers and 
journalists but they had not caught on to the dangers of social media.  
 
Tadgh noted that the ‘the first place they (sports stakeholders) will go is to the official 
page” and that is the ‘fastest way of getting news out there’, with updates or changes to the 
official statement. Michial gave an example of this after the death of one of their players;  
For two weeks we used Facebook and Twitter in a totally different way, we used it 
as an information tool... the funerals going to be this day, the book of memorial is 
open at this point. So instead of becoming… “the players are doing this, the team 
is announced”… and all that, we just went to very straight information about what 
was happening in that crisis and I found that a very useful tool.  
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In such a crisis, Tadgh stressed that the advantage of social media was the interaction, the 
chance for conversation and the opportunity for a sports organization to show ethical and 
‘human behaviour’. Such interaction perceived a crisis to be managed.  Other practitioners 
agreed that social media provides a platform to understand stakeholder’s issues or concerns, 
then allows you to monitor the general feeling towards the organization that could ultimately 
prevent a crisis from happening (Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011).  Some practical advice 
was provided for sport organizations to mitigate negative outcomes. In a crisis Donncha 
suggested creating a ‘dark-website or a dark-webpage... a page which sits on your server, all 
ready to be activated at the touch of a button should you have a crisis’, he goes on to explain 
that this website should provide ‘immediate information’.  This should be used instead of a 
banner link referring the viewer to a press release as that would appear as any other news story.  
Donncha provided an example of what it should contain citing a recent national food scandal, 
that reflects Coombs’ guidelines for post-crisis communications;  
What I want to find there [food company website] is immediate information of what 
I should do if I have [one of their] lasagnes in the fridge.  If I have bought it should 
I eat it or not eat it, should I return the product, I want to find out what [the company] 
are doing to reassure me... that dark page should have links to...food standards 
agency, local health bodies, it should help the consumer. 
Nevertheless, some drawbacks were clear. 
  
The speed at which a crisis escalated was another issue the practitioners identified with 
social media. Donncha noted ‘I used to say when we first did crisis media training... the first 
24 hours are the most important in any crisis, and now we are saying it’s the first 24 minutes, 
almost’. Speed is the reason why Coombs (2012) advises that an organization needs to be 
visible and active before and during crisis. If an organization does not utilize the opportunity 
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to put statements out on social media, ‘the conversation on the crisis will continue through 
social media without the organization’s voice being heard’ (Veil, et al., 2011, p. 118) and can 
lead to rumors and misguided public perception (Seeger, 2006).  
 
Numerous examples connected the speed of social media to the loss of control in 
managing a crisis. Michial explained how a lack of social media planning undermined his 
organization’s authority over their message, specifically by not controlling the growth of 
unofficial club branded social media sites,  
We had an issue on social media on the night that one of our players died. So, my 
predecessor didn’t start a Facebook page [for the club], someone else did [an 
unofficial site], and that page grew to 30,000 [followers] by the time I had joined.  
My predecessor started [our official] Facebook page but two years too late. So, we 
had an unofficial page that had 30,000 followers and we had an official page with 
12,000....so you talk about what dangers can come, it’s unofficial, or its about social 
media channels that you don’t have control of, putting information out to your 
followers that they think is you.  
 
Social media presented challenges to practitioners, however it was its potential 
advantages that could most readily assist in preventing, or at least controlling the timing of the 
tipping point to wrest organizational advantage. Despite these suggestions however, there were 
few examples of where this actually occurred that were provided, possibly revealing a gap 
between practitioner expectations and practical reality.  While social media generates another 
media-front to manage the crisis response, the respondents felt that the effective management 
of these streams could enhance a sport organization’s reputation.  The case was presented 
whereby a crisis was exacerbated by the release of confidential information via an unofficial 
 25 
social media site.  In response, the organization took control of their social media presence in 
the aftermath which prevented this from occurring again.  Fans through social media acted as 
‘faith-holders’ (Luoma-aho, 2006), and regulated negative comments the club received, and 
defended the reputation of the club toward other fans.  This loyalty acts as a buffer for 
individuals or sport organisations in crisis situations (Koerber & Zabara, 2017) and suggests 
the possible emergence of a remote stakeholder/influencer approach to online communications 
management during a crisis (Brown & Billings, 2013; Brown, et al., 2015).   
 
Despite the clear benefits and challenges presented by social media, most of the 
respondents felt that traditional media outlets were still more important than social.  Donncha 
confirmed; ‘in a crisis the majority of people will still turn to the traditional, trusted, 
professional, journalistic organization’.  This finding is noteworthy, considering the prevalence 
of social media in communication research (Spence et al., 2016), and could be a reflection of 
context whereby traditional media is arguably the region’s most trusted media source 
(Verhoeven et al, 2014).   
 
6.0 Conclusions and Further Research. 
In this study, we gained a welcome understanding of how Northern Irish sport communications 
practitioners’ crisis response approaches compared with those found in academia. Each 
research questions outlined above have been achieved. Practitioner’s in Northern Ireland adopt 
similarly logical approaches, which are based on, reflect and are heavily influenced by 
academic literature.  This suggests that in sport communication in Northern Ireland the gap 
between practitioners and academic knowledge is not gaping.  While this study’s 
generalizability is limited it does contribute to an accumulation of cases demonstrating how 
PR practitioners respond to crisis situations (Claeys & Opgenhaffen, 2016; Hu & Pang, 2016; 
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Strauβ & Jonkman, 2017; Verhoeven et al. (2014). Specifically, Verhoeven et al. (2014) found 
that different cultural contexts prioritize different forms of communication.  In this study, 
traditional media remained the primary media stakeholder.  We feel these findings creates value 
for wider audiences as it reinforces in various contexts the traditional approach can provide a 
more stable media outlet for the crisis response over and above, more contemporary 
mechanisms.  Nevertheless, social media has challenged the models employed by practitioners 
but their experiences have incorporated an awareness of the speed by which a crisis spreads 
and methods of control into the models in order to avoid exacerbating a crisis as strategies such 
as preparing external stakeholders, employees and athletes in safe social media use have been 
enacted.   
 
Seeger’s (2006) best practices were evident in the respondent data, and as such these 
findings contribute to the communication literature by demonstrating that in this case academic 
knowledge appears to be ingrained in practice.  Practitioners revealed that in their issues and 
crisis communication practice they stress the importance of interpersonal relationships 
(Manoli, 2016).  They use process approaches to issues and crisis management, seek to form 
partnerships with publics, remain open and honest, collaborate with credible sources, ensure 
media needs are met, communicate with compassion, concern and empathy, accept uncertainty, 
and ensure that their messages are self-effacing.   At this point work in this region needs to 
examine pre-crisis planning and ‘listening to the [wider] public’s concerns’ with regards to 
various issues, and not just their own supporters.  Nevertheless, given the embryonic stages of 
sport communications within Northern Ireland this research provides a sound basis to develop 
future practice in the area.   
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There were limitations of the approach that should be highlighted.  While the sample 
size was limited, there was the risk of conformity within the meanings shared between these 
participants.  That these were an elite group of individuals may exacerbate this issue due to the 
small scale of the Northern Irish sport media marketplace.  As such, many of these individuals 
share numerous personal and professional relationships which could lead to an agreed 
worldview or groupthink situation occurring.  It is also unlikely that due to the region covered 
and relatively small population (1.852 million – NISRA, 2016) these professionals are not 
exposed to the pressures from social media sites as practitioners in other regions who possess 
a large catchment of readers or subscribers experience, hence the focus remains on more 
traditional media relations approaches, while not dismissing social media the broadcast and 
news media remain the major constituents of these practitioners.  
 
Further research could examine two areas.  First, the models and ideas presented by the 
practitioners can be viewed, post-crisis from an objective standpoint to determine their success, 
or otherwise, and the implications for further crisis management development.  Second, and as 
Coombs (2012) suggests it is more important that further studies empirically test the practices 
outlined above, from within the organization, during a crisis event.  We join L’Etang (2012) in 
her suggestion for more ethnographic research to experience how issues jolt into crisis 
situations and witness the actual, lived experience of practitioners.  This would contribute an 
academic case study of issues and crisis management that can be contrasted not only with the 
models discussed earlier in the paper but also with the approaches outlined by the practitioners 
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